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No. 860204 - CA 
Appellant Childs submits the following Answer and 
Memorandum in response to respondent Metropolitan's Petition for 
Rehearing, pursuant to Rule 35, Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
1. Respondent Metropolitan in its Petition for 
Rehearing argues that this Court has overlooked or misapprehended 
a "number of issues" critical to the appeal. 
The Court's opinion addresses the differing plausible 
interpretations of the undefined policy term "regular use", and 
concludes that the term as utilized in the policy is ambiguous. 
The opinion did not address other issues for the obvious reason 
that it was not necessary to do so once an ambiguity was found to 
exist. 
Appellants prosecuted this appeal from the lower court's 
ruling, and specified on appeal the issue presented for 
resolution., An appellant is free to designate the issue or 
issues to be considered on appeal, and did so in this case. The 
appellants' designation presents a single issue, which appears at 
page 2 of their brief: 
The legal meaning of the undefined policy 
provision "regular use" is the issue for 
consideration on appeal. The question 
presented is whether the District Court 
erred in determining as a matter of law 
that the accident vehicle was one 
"available" for the insureds "regular 
use" under the stipulated facts, the 
policy terms, and applicable decisional 
law. (emphasis added) 
This Court was faced with only two possible resolutions 
of the single issue presented by the appeal, which were: 
1. To determine that the term "regular use" was not 
ambiguous; and if so, whether the lower court's judgment 
was supported by substantial evidence. 
2. To determine that the term "regular use" was 
ambiguous; and if so, reverse the lower court's 
judgment. 
Since under the stipulated facts this Court has found 
the policy term "regular use" to be ambiguous, it is not 
necessary for this Court to then apply the appellants' suggested 
definition of the term in order to determine whether or not the 
exclusion applies. The policy term "regular use" was found to be 
ambiguous for the reason that the opposing definitions urged b£ 
each of the parties were equally plausible interpretations; one 
of which preserved and the other of which defeated coverage. 
Construction against the creator of an ambiguity is a basic 
requirement of the law; as is a construction of ambiguous policy 
language which favors rather than defeats insurance coverage. 
Construing the ambiguity against its creator and in favor of 
coverage in this case mandates the action which the Court has 
taken. 
2. Metropolitan argues that this Court has adopted a 
definition of the term "regular use" in line with appellants1 
suggested "pattern of use" test. A plain reading of the opinion 
discloses that the tests suggested by both parties were 
considered and found to be equally plausible interpretations; 
meaning that the term has more than one different meaning. This 
Court has not "adopted" appellants1 suggested definition of the 
term, but has only found there to be an ambiguity which must be 
resolved against its creator. 
3. Metropolitan argues that the policy itself 
incorporates a "frequency" test rather than a "pattern of use" 
test because of the "temporary substitute automobile" provision 
contained within the non-owned automobile coverage exclusion. 
The policy nowhere utilizes the term "frequent" or 
"frequently"; and does not inform the reader just what the term 
"regular use" means, either in the "furnished" or "available" 
contexts. The "temporary substitute automobile" language deals 
only with a substitute automobile; which means one that is 
utilized in place of the described vehicle. It does not impart 
clear meaning to the term "regular use". 
4. Metropolitan argues that public policy behind the 
exclusion is not fostered by the adoption of a "pattern of use" 
test. 
As discussed above, this Court's opinion does not adopt 
a "pattern of use" test, or for that matter any other "test"; but 
simply concludes that there is an ambiguity in the policy 
language which must be resolved against its creator. 
Metropolitan's argument is deficient in failing to recognize that 
the exclusion does in fact apply where a non-owned automobile is 
being use within the scope of the purpose for which it was 
provided to the insured. There is under the Court's opinion no 
"free" coverage created for such use. The "drive other cars" 
coverage is designed to provide coverage where the use being made 
of the vehicle at the time of a given accident is not within the 
scope of the purpose for which it was provided; and under 
circumstances where the insured would ordinarily be driving his 
own vehicle, for which he had paid a premium. There is in 
actuality no additional or "free" coverage created under the 
Court's ruling, since the reason the insured would be utilizing 
his own vehicle for the drinking activities if he did not happen 
to be operating the employer's pickup. Metropolitan's exposure 
would be the same in either event. 
5. Metropolitan argues that this Court failed to 
consider the "business use" exclusion of the policy. 
From the stipulated facts, Mr. Finlayson's use of the 
FINCO pickup could not by any stretch of the imagination be 
considered a "business use" at the time the accident occurred. 
This Court clearly addresses that point at page 3 of the opinion: 
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Since the truck was furnished to Neal 
Finlayson for the use in the course of 
his employment, i.e., answering calls for 
and performing mechanical repairs, his 
use of the truck to go to and from the 
"Animal House" bar was outside the 
course, especially in view of the 
limitations expressly put on his use of 
the truck by FINCO. (emphasis added) 
It is significant that the policy insuring FINCO's 
pickup did not insure only its "business use". There has been no 
suggestion, stipulation, or judicial finding there was any 
"business use" involved. The stipulated facts and this Court's 
conclusion are to the contrary, 
6. Metropolitan argues that this Court did not consider 
or address the fact that the truck was "available" to Neal 
Finlayson for the use to which it was being put at the time of 
the accident. 
The stipulated facts are that the accident vehicle was 
not "furnished" or "available" to Neal Finlayson for drinking 
excursions to the Animal House or elsewhere which were unrelated 
to his employment. As this Court has observed, the undefined 
policy term "regular use" could plausibly mean what either party 
contends. The ambiguity is obvious, and its existence in and of 
itself resolves the only issue presented by this appeal. 
7. Metropolitan argues that this Court did not consider 
the "potential" use for which the employer had made the truck 
available, which potential use might conceivably include the 
unauthorized drinking excursion to the Animal House. 
If the accident had occurred during the course and scope 
of Neal Finlayson's employment activities, there would be no 
coverage and no problem. The fact is it did not. The 
"potential" for an unauthorized use does not make the truck into 
a vehicle "furnished" or "available" for such unauthorized use. 
If the "potential" for such use were to be determinitive, the 
policy could and should have said so, and it did not. 
Ironically, Metropolitan's argument itself illustrates the 
ambiguity of the undefined policy term "regular use". 
8. Metropolitan argues that the "use" to which the 
truck was being put at the time of the accident was the same as 
it had been on numerous other occasions; i.e., taking Mr. 
Finlayson home, and that this Court should consider its use for 
that purpose at the time of the accident to be a part of its 
"regular use". 
The stipulated facts include the parties1 agreement that 
the accident vehicle had never been used to facilitate a drinking 
excursion as it was on the accident date; either in driving to or 
from the drinking place. The stipulated facts are that the 
employer's permission did not cover such use. The fortuitous 
fact that the Finlayson brothers were headed home after departing 
from the course of their employment on a Bacchanalian lark at 
the Animal House does not return them to the course or scope of 
their employer's business. They had abandoned the employer's 
business when they decided to take the rest of the day off and 
drink. Under the stipulated facts, their use of the accident 
vehicle cannot possibly be considered a "business use" as urged 
by the appellant. 
9. Metropolitan argues that this Court did not address 
the public policy supporting the "drive other cars" exclusion. 
Public policy considerations are not relevant where 
there are other adequate legal bases for a court.-:' opinion. The 
finding of an ambiguity alone obviates any nee - address public 
po11cy conb iderati ons, 
10. Metropolitan argues that this Court did not 
consider the internal language of tne -xr'wi^i-* i^ch it claims 
supports the contention that there is no ambiguity. 
This Court's opinion addresses the arguments and 
authorities of both parties and the i nternal language of the 
policy li is the policy language itself which creates the 
ambiguity. There is nothing more to consider in the way of 
policy language than that *MH h h.r "><- i presents] i » \ " 
considered by the Court, 
11. Metropolitan argues that this Court did not address 
the fact that the FINCO can" ier had ptc:?"1 nously acknowledged the 
accident to be one covered by its insurance policy. 
The FINCO policy is not at issue in this litigation; and 
the payment of any sums by way of settlement thereunder has no 
relevance whatever to the issue of this appeal. Respondent's 
argument implies that payment under the FINCO policy establishes 
that the accident arose from a "business use" of the accident 
vehicle by Neal Finlayson. Such an implication is unwarranted. 
The FINCO policy does not insure only business use of the 
described vehicle. It insures other and even non consensual 
uses. The FINCO carrier could not have escaped liability, and 
its payment proves nothing. 
Any payment under the FINCO policy must of course must 
be credited against any verdict in appellant's wrongful death 
action; but that is its only effect. Full or partial payment 
under another policy, by another carrier, in behalf of another 
insured has no relevance whatever to the issue raised by this 
appeal. 
12. Metropolitan argues that there are a number of 
"other issues" beyond the issue of whether Neal Finlayson's use 
of the FINCO pickup constituted "regular use" within the meaning 
of the policy. 
All of the "other" issues raised by respondent in its 
petition are secondary to that of the ambiguity which the court 
has found to exist, and are rendered meaningless by that 
finding. The presence of the ambiguity in and of itself mandates 
this Court's decision; without regard to the various opposing but 
plausible interpretations of the ambiguous policy term. There is 
simply no need to go further. 
13. Metropolitan argues that the "mere" finding of an 
ambiguity is not dispositve. 
Under the stipulated facts, the ambiguous language leads 
to different and equally plausible results, one supporting and 
the other defeating coverage. The Court and the parties are 
legally bound to that interpretation which favors coverage. Once 
an ambiguity has been found, there is nothing more to consider. 
14. Metropolitan argues that since state law requires 
the approval of policy forms by the Commissioner of Insurance, 
the insurance contract forms are not "unilaterally drafted" by 
insurance companies and "imposed upon an unsuspecting public". 
While it is true that policy forms innst be filed with 
ami approved by the Insurance Department before their sale to the 
public, there is no provision in trie Insurance Code (Title 31) 
which precludes an insurer from infv r r .>r _> t i nq ,i precise 
definition of policy terms which would reduce or eliminate 
ambiguity. The insurance Department would never reject a more 
precise definition of any policy term. 
Metropolitan argues that further inquiry into 
"intent" is required by the Court to determine what effect a 
particular "definition" may have •. '••••X\--,L" of the 
exclusion. 
As indicated, the facts are stipulated. There was no 
"negotiation" with respect tu Mv* meaning of the policy term 
"regular use"; and the term in its policy context is ambiguous. 
The parties1 "intent" (if any) is irrelvant. 
16. Metropolitan ;jes that the policy exclusion does 
not pertain to a particular use at a particular time, and that 
the "regular use" exclusion should be broadly interpreted to 
include the "furnished" or "available" concepts; regardless of 
the particular use to which the vehicle is being put at the time 
of a given accident. 
The weakness of this argument is that the terms utilized 
could be read, and have been read by other courts, both as 
covering and as not covering a particular unauthorized use. It is 
that possibility of opposing but equally plausible 
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interpretations which creates the ambiguity. 
17. Metropolitan argues that the exclusion's terms 
incorporate by implication a "frequency" test which this Court 
should consider to remove the ambiguity. Respondent argues that 
use of the terms "other than a temporary substitute automobile" 
in the excLusion incorporates a "frequency" test which must be 
applied to the undefined term "regular use". 
The policy nowhere utilizes the term "frequent" or 
"frequently". The policy does utilize the term "regular use" in 
a context which makes it ambiguous under certain factual 
circumstances such as that to which the parties have 
stipulated. A "temporary substitute automobile" may or may not 
be one furnished for "regular use". Under the stipulated facts, 
it is entirely plausible that the accident vehicle might be 
considered as a "temporary substitute automobile" and therefore 
covered by definition; since it was being used in place of Neal 
Finlayson's own automobile to facilitate the drinking 
activities. Metropolitan's use of the term "temporary substitute 
automobile" as an exception to the exclusion does not constitute 
a policy specification of a "frequency" test or render the term 
"regular use" any less ambiguous. If anything, the policy's 
assurance of coverage for a non-owned "temporary substitute 
automobile" reinforces the argument that coverage should be 
extended under the present facts; since the accident vehicle was 
being used as a temporary substitute for the insured's own. 
It should be noted that the divergent opinions of other 
courts which are cited in this court's opinion all involved 
policies which contained "temporary substitute automobile" 
provisions that failed to produce uniform interpretations. The 
ambiguity persists regardless of the "temporary substitute 
automobile" provision. 
18. Metropolitan argues that if the vehicle is 
"furnished" or "available" for the regular use of the insured 
(whether actually used or not), it is not a "non-owned 
automobile" according to the policy definition. 
If the vehicle is not used, there is of course no 
problem. The purpose of insurance is to cover accidents, which 
ordinarily occur only while a vehicle is being used. If it _i£ 
used, one should be able to determine by reading the policy terms 
what use is covered and what is not. Metropolitan's policy 
language fails to inform the reader with any degree of certainty 
what is meant by the term "regular use". The insured cannot tell 
by reading the policy whether he is covered or not. The fact 
that the courts themselves have reached opposing interpretations 
is significant, since judges are generally more capable of 
reading and understanding contracts than laymen. 
19. Metropolitan argues against coverage because Mr. 
Finlayson did not list the accident truck on his own policy and 
pay a premium for it. 
As demonstrated above, it is the insured's unauthorized, 
temporary, or irregular use of the vehicle that is covered. The 
situtation is comparable to an insured's borrowing a car, or for 
that matter, stealing one. Metropolitan was aware when it issued 
the policy that its insured would occasionally operate other cars 
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for his purposes. The company included "drive other car" 
coverage in the policy both to provide for such anticipated use 
and to make its policy more attractive for the insuring public to 
buy. A non-owned automobile's use in connection with non-work 
related drinking activities is precisely the type of 
unauthorized, temporary or irregular use which the coverage 
contemplates. The FINCO pickup had never been used for such 
purposes before, and there is no suggestion that it was ever used 
for such purposes again. 
20. Metropolitan finally and once again argues that 
this Court failed to consider the policy's "business use" 
exclusion. 
This point of Metropolitan's Petition for Rehearing has 
been addressed above and at pages 3 and 4 of the Court's opinion. 
CONCLUSION 
The arguments presented in support of Metropolitan's 
Petition for Rehearing are, without exception, devoid of merit. 
Reopening the appeal or reversing this Court's decision would 
encourage the use of ambiguous policy language. If there is to 
be any public policy consideration, it should be to foster 
certainty rather than the uncertainty which would be promoted by 
ignoring the ambiguity which Metropolitan has created and 
allowing it to escape liability. The company and not the 
insuring public should pay for Metropolitan's error in failing to 
incorporate a meaningful definition of the ambiguous term it 
chose to use. 
DATED this n day of April, 1988. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ANTHONY M. THURBER 
Attorney for Defendant-
Appellant Childs 
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